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That interest was not focused on race alone but encompassed all factors that may contribute to student body diversity, id., at 337, including, e.g., having overcome personal adversity and family hardship, id., at 338. 67759, at 9 (Unlike the Massachusetts Court, the Illinois Supreme Court has recently held its law to eliminate racial imbalance unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); ibid., n.1. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 4950 (1973) (extolling local control for the opportunity it offers for participation in the decisionmaking process that determines how . The petitioner in the Louisville case received a letter from the school board informing her that her kindergartener would not be allowed to attend the school of petitioners choosing because of the childs race. there are two compelling interests: 1. remedying the effect of past intentional discrimination 2. interest of student body diversity in higher education 1. Grutter recognized a compelling interest in a law schools attainment of a diverse student body. Student Choice and Project Renaissance, 1991 to 1996. Hundreds of state and federal statutes and regulations use racial classifications for educational or other purposes. [Footnote 7], When petitioner Crystal Meredith moved into the school district in August 2002, she sought to enroll her son, Joshua McDonald, in kindergarten for the 20022003 school year. If that is so, then all of Seattles earlier (even more race-conscious) plans must also have been unconstitutional. In 1999, several parents brought a lawsuit in federal court attacking the plans use of racial guidelines at one of the districts magnet schools. 05915, at 159, 147. 2005) (Parents IV). . See id., at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). And it is for them to debate how best to educate the Nations children and how best to administer Americas schools to achieve that aim. Justice Anthony Kennedy did not join parts of the opinion of Chief Justice Roberts. 05908, pp. If a parent identifies more than one race on the form, [t]he application will not be accepted and, if necessary, the enrollment service person taking the application will indicate one box. App. This is not to deny that there is a cost in applying a state-mandated racial label. Ante, at 17 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 2d 834, 839840, and n. 6 (WD Ky. 2004) (McFarland I). It was then more faithful to Brown and more respectful of our precedent than it is today. A. I dont have a definition for that); id., at 228a229a (I dont think weve ever sat down and said, Define racially concentrated school exactly on point in quantitative terms. I dont think weve ever had that conversation); Tr. ; see also ante, at 22, n.15 (plurality opinion). See ante, at 1517, 23 (concurring opinion). See ibid. There has been considerable interest in this case, as demonstrated by the extraordinary number (approximately sixty) of amicus briefs filed in the case. Independent School Dist., 719 S.W. 2d 350, 352353 (Tex. And to the extent the plurality opinion can be interpreted to foreclose consideration of these interests, I disagree with that reasoning. at 17. The dissent does not face the complicated questions attending its proposed standard. of Boston v. Board of Education, 352 Mass. 32, Exh. These are not affirmative action plans, and hence individualized scrutiny is simply beside the point. 394, 401403 (1994) (hereinafter Dawkins & Braddock); Wells & Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects of School Desegregation, 64 Rev. Indeed, remedial measures geared toward such broad and unrelated societal ills have no logical stopping point, ibid., and threaten to become ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future, Wygant, supra, at 276 (plurality opinion). The dissent attempts to marginalize the notion of a color-blind Constitution by consigning it to me and Members of todays plurality. Furthermore, it would leave our equal-protection jurisprudence at the mercy of elected government officials evaluating the evanescent views of a handful of social scientists. of Oral Arg. In over one-third of the assignments affected by the racial tiebreaker, then, the use of race in the end made no difference, and the district could identify only 52 students who were ultimately affected adversely by the racial tiebreaker in that it resulted in assignment to a school they had not listed as a preference and to which they would not otherwise have been assigned. And contexts differ dramatically one from the other. And [p]referring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.). 2d 304. Each respondent has asserted that its assignment of individual students by race is permissible because there is no other way to avoid racial isolation in the school districts. Importantly, it considered that issue only under rational-basis review, 39 Ill. 2d, at 600, 237 N.E. 2d, at 502 (The test of any legislative classification essentially is one of reasonableness), which even the dissent grudgingly recognizes is an improper standard for evaluating express racial classifications. He writes that Justice Breyer misused and misapplied previous Supreme Court precedents in this area and that he greatly exaggerates the consequences of the decision of this case. And even if the determination is difficult, it is one the dissent acknowledges must be made to determine what remedies school districts are required to adopt. As these programs demonstrate, every time the government uses racial criteria to bring the races together, post, at 29, someone gets excluded, and the person excluded suffers an injury solely because of his or her race. Parents Involved VI, 377 F.3d 949 (2004). in No. 7045 and 7291 (WD Ky., Sept. 24, 1985), p.3; Memorandum from Donald W. Ingwerson, Superintendent, to the Board of Education, Jefferson Cty. 05908, at 257a (Q. The Jefferson County Board of Education fails to meet this threshold mandate. ); internal quotation marks omitted). The historical and factual context in which these cases arise is critical. But Louisville should be able to answer the relevant questions on remand. Though this may oversimplify the matter a bit, one of the main concerns underlying those opinions was this: If it is legitimate for school authorities to work to avoid racial isolation in their schools, must they do so only by indirection and general policies? Disappointed students are not rejected from a States flagship graduate program; they simply attend a different one of the districts many public schools, which in aspiration and in fact are substantially equal. Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. The orders requirements reflected a (newly enlarged) school district student population of about 135,000, approximately 20% of whom were black. . By 1972, however, the Louisville School District remained highly segregated. App. Justice Breyers reliance on McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39 (1971), post, at 2324, 2930, highlights how far removed the discussion in the dissent is from the question actually presented in these cases. [Footnote 10] There are good reasons not to apply a lesser standard to these cases. However, the question as to whether the constitution requires a local school board, or a State, to act to undo de facto school segregation is simply not here concerned. See App. In light of this Courts conclusions in Grutter, the compelling nature of these interests in the context of primary and secondary public education follows here a fortiori. The Constitution and our precedents require more. Pp. It would stop this march of progress, this onward sweep). Where that is so, the judge would carefully examine the programs details to determine whether the use of race-conscious criteria is proportionate to the important ends it serves. [Footnote 14]. Post, at 41. Compare Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 809810 (CA1 1998) (Boudin, J., concurring), with Comfort, 418 F. 3d, at 2829 (Boudin, C.J., concurring). Purportedly benign race-based decisionmaking suffers the same constitutional infirmity as invidious race-based decisionmaking. For decades now, these school boards have considered and adopted and revised assignment plans that sought to rely less upon race, to emphasize greater student choice, and to improve the conditions of all schools for all students, no matter the color of their skin, no matter where they happen to reside. http://reportcard. The broad interest in racial diversity in education generally could potentially filter through all facets of the school, and even into elementary education. Parents of students denied assignment to particular schools under these plans solely because of their race brought suit, contending that allocating children to different public schools on the basis of race violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection. of Ed. Jefferson County Public Schools operates the public school system in metropolitan Louisville, Kentucky. 2d 1224, 1240 (WD Wash. 2001) (Parents Involved I). of New Kent Cty., 391 U. S. 430, 435436 (1968). The discrepancy identified is not some simple and straightforward error that touches only upon the peripheries of the districts use of individual racial classifications. A similar reasoning could be applied in this case. In briefing and argument before this Court, Seattle contends that its use of race helps to reduce racial concentration in schools and to ensure that racially concentrated housing patterns do not prevent nonwhite students from having access to the most desirable schools. 3, p.17 (The Court is dealing with thousands of local school districts and schools. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit originally reversed, 285 F. 3d 1236 (9th Cir. It established that the decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. 05908, at 103a. And second, Kennedy faults the dissent for ignoring the "presumptive invalidity of a State's use of racial classifications to differentiate its treatment of individuals.". in Brown I, p. 7 (Robert L. Carter, Dec. 9, 1952). Classifying and assigning schoolchildren according to a binary conception of race is an extreme approach in light of our precedents and our Nations history of using race in public schools, and requires more than such an amorphous end to justify it. In 1958, black parents whose children attended Harrison Elementary School (with a black student population of over 75%) wrote the Seattle board, complaining that the boundaries for the Harrison Elementary School were not set in accordance with the long-established standards of the School District but were arbitrarily set with an end to excluding colored children from McGilvra School, which is adjacent to the Harrison school district.. PICS cites previous Court cases holding that when a means used does not actually address all the harm it purports to address, it cannot be a compelling interest. [Footnote 11]. And it was that position that prevailed in this Court, which emphasized in its remedial opinion that what was [a]t stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis, and what was required was determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis. Brown II, supra, at 300301 (emphasis added). The Seattle Board Statement Reaffirming Diversity Rationale speaks of the inherent educational value in [p]roviding students the opportunity to attend schools with diverse student enrollment, App. I write separately to address several of the contentions in Justice Breyers dissent (hereinafter the dissent). If we look at cases decided during the interim between Brown and Adarand, we can see how a rigid adherence to tiers of scrutiny obscures Browns clear message. Bd. 539 U. S., at 328. That decision not only expressed our appraisal of the merits of the appeal, but it constitutes a precedent that the Court overrules today. A mixture? 377 F.3d at 958. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. Governmental use of race-based criteria can arise in the context of, for example, census forms, research expenditures for diseases, assignments of police officers patrolling predominantly minority-race neighborhoods, efforts to desegregate racially segregated schools, policies that favor minorities when distributing goods or services in short supply, actions that create majority-minority electoral districts, peremptory strikes that remove potential jurors on the basis of race, and others. Assessed in any objective manner, there is no comparison between the two. It is reasonable to conclude that such resegregation can create serious educational, social, and civic problems. In 1996, the school board adopted the present plan, which began in 1999. 254, 256, 261 (1956) (40 of Kentuckys 180 school districts began desegre- 417, 428429 287 N.E. 2d 438, 447448 (1972). in No. One will search Grutter in vain for similarly persuasive evidence of narrow tailoring as the school districts have presented here. So long as the plan is narrowly tailored, meaning that it uses the least restrictive means to obtain the benefits that flow from diversity and implements a plan that does not result in an impermissible quota, school districts can have some say in the racial make-up of their student body. Question: In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.1 (2007), the Supreme Court ruled that O public school policies that assigned students to a school on the basis of race were constitutional. It added that the fact that a law treats [a person] unequally because of his or her race . Seattle provides three forward-lookingas opposed to remedialjustifications for its race-based assignment plan. ), appeal dismd for want of a substantial federal question, 484 U. S. 804 (1987). Executive and legislative branches, which for generations now have considered these types of policies and procedures, should be permitted to employ them with candor and with confidence that a constitutional violation does not occur whenever a decisionmaker considers the impact a given approach might have on students of different races. Other problems are evident in Seattles system, but there is no need to address them now. 2. Reg. Observers claim that the Supreme Court's decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 05915, p.7, n.4; Tr. History should teach greater humility. This is a decision that the Court and the Nation will come to regret.