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Gulf of Tonkin incident | Definition, Date, Summary, Significance The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. The House passed the resolution unanimously.17 Subscribe now and never hit a limit. Over the next few years, Johnson used the resolution to rapidly escalate American involvement in the Vietnam War. LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. His assessment of the evidence now raised doubts in his mind about what really had happened. But only a few minutes later, McNamara was back on the line with news of a second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. The errors made in the initial analysis were due to a combination of inexperience, limited knowledge of North Vietnams operations and an operational imperative to ensure that the U.S. Navy ships would not be caught by surprise. However, unlike the good old days when -- as the wizened cynical Frenchmen put it, history was a lie agreed-on -- no longer can governments after the battle simply set down how it went and that is that. The first such Desoto mission was conducted off the North Vietnamese coast in February 1964, followed by more through the spring. Gulf of Tonkin - National Security Agency You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. 14. :: Douglas Pike, director of the Indochina Studies Program at the University of California-Berkeley, is the author of the forthcoming "Vietnam and the U.S.S.R.: Anatomy of an Alliance.". History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. The commander also added the requirement of collecting photographic intelligence of ships and aircraft encountered, as well as weather and hydrographic information. Just after midnight on 31 July, PTF-2 and PTF-5, commanded by Lieutenant Huyet, arrived undetected at a position 800 yards northeast of the island. The stage was set. 1. We still seek no wider war.. By late 1958 it was obvious that a major Communist buildup was underway in South Vietnam, but the American SIGINT community was ill-placed and ill-equipped to deal with it. The North Vietnamese believed that, although they had lost one boat, they had deterred an attack on their coast. Milestones: 19611968 - Office of the Historian Suns and Stars 10. Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR) challenged the account, and argued that despite evidence that 34A missions and Desoto patrols were not operating in tandem, Hanoi could only have concluded that they were. Two nearly identical episodes six weeks apart; two nearly opposite responses. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1992), p. 59. On July 31, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox commenced a Desoto patrol off North Vietnam. In fact, the United States had been waging a small, secret war against North Vietnam since 1961. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. On 3 August, the CIA confirmed that "Hanois naval units have displayed increasing sensitivity to U.S. and South Vietnamese naval activity in the Gulf of Tonkin during the past several months. Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. The Maddox fired againthis time to killhitting the second North Vietnamese boat just as it launched two torpedoes. Surprised by the North Vietnamese response, Johnson decided that the United States could not back away from the challenge and directed his commanders in the Pacific to continue with the Desoto missions. Case Closed: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - HistoryNet CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986], p. 422). The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. If there had been any doubt before about whose hand was behind the raids, surely there was none now. PRX is a 501(c)(3) organization recognized by the IRS: #263347402. A North Vietnamese patrol boat also trailed the American ships, reporting on their movements to Haiphong. "1 Most of these would be shore bombardment. During May, Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, the Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief, had suggested that 34A raids could be coordinated "with the operation of a shipboard radar to reduce the possibility of North Vietnamese radar detection of the delivery vehicle." Moving in closer, the crew could see their targeta communications towersilhouetted in the moonlight. After the Tonkin Gulf incident, the State Department cabled Seaborn, instructing him to tell the North Vietnamese that "neither the Maddox or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam] islands." This article by Capt. The Desoto patrol continued with another destroyer, the Turner Joy (DD-951), coming along to ward off further trouble. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution At this point, U.S. involvement in Vietnam remained largely in the background. Not reported at the time, Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if the North Vietnamese came within 10,000 yards of the ship. 12. The Gulf of Tonkin incident - Vietnam War One element of American assistance to South Vietnam included covert support for South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnams coastal transportation facilities and networks. Neither Herricks doubts nor his reconnaissance request was well received, however. It took only a little imagination to see why the North Vietnamese might connect the two. It is not NSA's intention to prove or Then, everyones doubts were swept away when a SIGINT intercept from one of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats reported the claim that it had shot down two American planes in the battle area. As the torpedo boats continued their high-speed approach, Maddox was ordered to fire warning shots if they closed inside 10,000 yards. Senate investigations in 1968 and 1975 did little to clarify the events or the evidence, lending further credence to the various conspiracy theories. Moments later, one of the crewmen spotted a North Vietnamese Swatow patrol boat bearing down on them. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin While Kennedy had at least the comforting illusion of progress in Vietnam (manufactured by Harkins and Diem), Johnson faced a starker picture of confusion, disunity, and muddle in Saigon and of a rapidly growing Viet Cong in the countryside. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m.. 13. The disclaimer is required, if for no other reason than because of Chapter 15, "The American Response to the Gulf of Tonkin Attacks," about which more later. WebKnown today as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, this event spawned the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 7 August 1964, ultimately leading to open war between North Vietnam and The only solution was to get rid of the evidence. WebGulf of Tonkin Resolution, also called Tonkin Gulf Resolution, resolution put before the U.S. Congress by Pres. Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. 313-314. That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack. Reinforced by Turner Joy, Herrick returned to the area on Aug. 4. It reveals what commanders actually knew, what SIGINT analysts believed and the challenges the SIGINT community and its personnel faced in trying to understand and anticipate the aggressive actions of an imaginative, deeply committed and elusive enemy. As far as the headlines were concerned, that was it, but the covert campaign continued unabated. Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident. WebThe Senate passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with only two opposing votes, and the House of Representatives passed it unanimously. Two hours later, Captain Herrick reported the sinking of two enemy patrol boats. 14. A National Security Agency report released in 2007 reveals unequivocally that the alleged Aug. 4, 1964, attack by North Vietnam on U.S. destroyers never actually happened. The entirety of the original intercepts, however, were not examined and reanalyzed until after the war. Because the North Vietnamese had fewer than 50 Swatows, most of them up north near the important industrial port of Haiphong, the movement south of one-third of its fleet was strong evidence that 34A and the Desoto patrols were concerning Hanoi. What did and didnt happen in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and 4 has long been in dispute, but the decisions that the Johnson Administration and Congress made based on an interpretation of those events were undeniably monumental. Until the ICC investigation blew over a week later, the commandos camped on a small pier. A lesser-known fact is that Jim Morrisons father, Captain George Stephen Morrison, commanded the Carrier Division during the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. The after-action reports from the participants in the Gulf arrived in Washington several hours after the report of the second incident. Two days later, August 4, Maddox returned to the area, supported by the destroyer Turner Joy (DD-951). The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and many more recent experiences only reinforce the need for intelligence analysts and decision makers to avoid relying exclusively on any single intelligence sourceeven SIGINTparticularly if other intelligence sources are available and the resulting decisions might cost lives. A long-standing program, the Desoto patrols consisted of American warships cruising in international waters to conduct electronic surveillance operations. Those same reports were shown to the select congressional and senate committees that also investigated the incident. The tug departed Haiphong at approximately 0100 hours on August 4, while the undamaged torpedo boat, T-146, was ordered to stay with the crippled boats and maintain an alert for enemy forces. At about 0600, the two U.S. destroyers resumed the Desoto patrol. President, weve just had a report from the commander of that task force out there The report is that they have observed and we don't know by what means two unidentified vessels and three unidentified prop aircraft in the vicinity of the destroyers, McNamara told the president. In the future, conventional operations would receive all the attention. The Health Conspiracy. The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. 426-436. Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident - ThoughtCo Subscribe to LBJ's War onApple Podcasts. WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN THE GULF OF TONKIN? (2021, February 16). Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m., Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, vol. JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation (Stanfordville, NY: 1979), vol. 11. This time the U.S. ships detected electronic signals and acoustic indications of a likely second North Vietnamese naval attack, and they requested U.S. air support. National Security Agency While many facts and details have emerged in the past 44 years to persuade most observers that some of the reported events in the Gulf never actually happened, key portions of the critical intelligence information remained classified until recently. Kennedy Hickman is a historian, museum director, and curator who specializes in military and naval history. . Suddenly, North Vietnamese guns opened fire from the shore. For the maritime war specialist, it is of course invaluable. This time, however, President Johnson reacted much more skeptically and ultimately decided to take no retaliatory action. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations., The next day, the president addressed Congress, seeking the power to to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.. Thus, the South Vietnamese raid on Hon Me Island, a major North Vietnamese infiltration staging point, became the tripwire that set off the August 2 confrontation in the Gulf of Tonkin. The study debunks two strongly held but opposing beliefs about what happened on both dayson the one hand that neither of the reported attacks ever took place at all, and on the other that there was in fact a second deliberate North Vietnamese attack on August 4. In an effort to increase pressure on North Vietnam, several Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTFs) were covertly purchased and transferred to South Vietnam. Message, COMUSMACV 291233Z July 1964, CP 291345Z July 1964. The Pyramid and All-Seeing Eye . McNamara took advantage of Morses imprecision and concentrated on the senators connection between 34A and Desoto, squirming away from the issue of U.S. involvement in covert missions by claiming that the Maddox "was not informed of, was not aware [of], had no evidence of, and so far as I know today had no knowledge of any possible South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands Senator Morse referred to." For the Navys official account stating that both incidents occurred and that 34A and Desoto were "entirely distinct," see Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. Any escalation in the bombing of the North risked provoking the Russians or, more likely, the Chinese. By then, the two American ships were approximately 80 nautical miles from the nearest North Vietnamese coastline and steaming southeast at 20 knots. The report also identifies what SIGINT couldand could nottell commanders about their enemies and their unreliable friends in the war. It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. Meanwhile, by late August 3, the North Vietnamese had learned the condition of their torpedo boats and ordered a salvage tug to recover the damaged craft. And, of course, McNamara himself knew about the "South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands," but his cautiously worded answer got him out of admitting it. 2, pp. AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. But the administration dithered, informing the embassy only that "further OPLAN 34A operations should be held off pending review of the situation in Washington. But by the end of June, the situation had changed. PTF-3 and PTF-6 broke off and streaked south for safety; they were back in port before 1200. Despite McNamaras nimble answers, North Vietnams insistence that there was a connection between 34A and the Desoto patrols was only natural. Around midday on Aug. 4, Adm. Grant Sharp, the top navy commander in the Pacific, made a call to the Joint Chiefs, and it was clear there were significant doubts about this second incident. Captain Herrick had been ordered to be clear of the patrol area by nightfall, so he turned due east at approximately 1600. Tonkin Gulf Maddox detected the torpedo boats on radar at a range of almost 20,000 yards and turned away at its top speed of 32 knots. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. no isolated event. For some reason, however, the second Desoto Mission, to be conducted by Maddox, was not canceled, even though it was scheduled to start at the same time that a late July commando mission was being launched.