[74]. August 4, 2015 A few months after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, General Dwight D.Eisenhower commented during a social occasion how he had hoped that the war might have ended without our having to use the atomic bomb. This virtually unknown evidence from the diary of Robert P. Meiklejohn, an assistant to Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, published for the first time today by the National Security Archive, confirms that the future President Eisenhower had early misgivings about the first use of atomic weapons by the United States. If the United States had been more flexible about the demand for unconditional surrender by explicitly or implicitly guaranteeing a constitutional monarchy would Japan have surrendered earlier than it did? The Soviets had notified Japan's Ambassador to Moscow on the night of the eighth that the Soviet Union would be at war with Japan as of August 9th (Butow, pg. The National Security Agency kept the Magic diplomatic and military summaries classified for many years and did not release the entire series for 1942 through August 1945 until the early 1990s.[36]. Also included, to give a wider perspective, were translations of Japanese documents not widely available before. By providing access to a broad range of U.S. and Japanese documents, mainly from the spring and summer of 1945, interested readers can see for themselves the crucial source material that scholars have used to shape narrative accounts of the historical developments and to frame their arguments about the questions that have provoked controversy over the years. The president, however, wrote in long-hand a text that that might approximate what he said that evening. The 70th anniversary of the event presents an opportunity to set the record straight on five widely held myths about the bomb. [66]. Lacking direct knowledge of conditions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Henshaw and Coveyou had their own data on the biological effects of radiation and could make educated guesses. Martin Sherwin has argued that the Franck committee shared an important assumption with Truman et al.--that an atomic attack against Japan would `shock the Russians--but drew entirely different conclusions about the import of such a shock. Unaware of the findings of Health Division scientists, Groves and Rhea saw the injuries as nothing more than good thermal burns.[75], Documents 94A-B: General Farrell Surveys the Destruction, RG 77, Tinian Files, April-December 1945, box 17, Envelope B, A month after the attacks Groves deputy, General Farrell, traveled to Japan to see for himself the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Frank, 258; Bernstein (1995), 147; Walker (2005), 322. Every major country of the time was involved in the war. While McCloy later recalled that Truman expressed interest, he said that Secretary of State Byrnes squashed the proposal because of his opposition to any deals with Japan. He wanted to intimidate the Soviet Union c. He wanted Japan's unconditional surrender d. He felt it would strengthen U.S.-Soviet relations Historians and the public continue to debate if the bombings were justified, the causes of Japan's surrender, the casualties that would have resulted if the U.S. had invaded Japan, and more. For convenience, Barton Bernsteins rendition is provided here but linked here are the scanned versions of Trumans handwriting on the National Archives website (for 15-30 July). After the first minute of dropping "Fat Man," 39,000 men, women and children were killed. With the devastating battle for Okinawa winding up, Truman and the Joint Chiefs stepped back and considered what it would take to secure Japans surrender. It occurred to me that a quarter of a million of the flower of our young manhood was worth a couple of Japanese cities, and I still think that they were and are. RG 77, MED, H-B files, folder no. To keep his pledge at Yalta to enter the war against Japan and to secure the territorial concessions promised at the conference (e.g., Soviet annexation of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin and a Soviet naval base at Port Arthur, etc.) Some may associate this statement with one that Eisenhower later recalled making to Stimson. Washington, D.C., August 5, 2005 - Sixty years ago this month, the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, and the Japanese government surrendered to the United States and its allies. The Soviet invasion was.[58], Clemson University Libraries, Special Collections, Clemson, SC; Mss 243, Walter J. [73]. Correspondence,International Security16 (Winter 1991/1992): 214-221. Why were alternatives not pursued? Signed by about 68 Manhattan Project scientists, mainly physicists and biologists (copies with the remaining signatures are in the archival file), the petition did not explicitly reject military use, but raised questions about an arms race that military use could instigate and requested Truman to publicize detailed terms for Japanese surrender. Cited by Barton J. Bernstein, Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Early Thinking About Tactical Nuclear Weapons,International Security15 (1991) at page 167. Record Group 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Formerly Top Secret Correspondence of Secretary of War Stimson (Safe File), July 1940-September 1945, box 12, S-1, Tacitly dissenting from the Targeting Committees recommendations, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall argued for initial nuclear use against a clear-cut military target such as a large naval installation. If that did not work, manufacturing areas could be targeted, but only after warning their inhabitants. The bomb would be dropped in the citys center. The continued controversy has revolved around the following, among other, questions: This compilation will not attempt to answer these questions or use primary sources to stake out positions on any of them. Tagaki was soon at the center of a cabal of Japanese defense officials, civil servants, and academics, which concluded that, in the end, the emperor would have to impose his decision on the military and the government. Takagi kept a detailed account of his activities, part of which was in diary form, the other part of which he kept on index cards. Sadao Asada, The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japans Decision to Surrender: A Reconsideration,Pacific Historical Review67 (1998): 101-148; Bix, 523; Frank, 348; Hasegawa, 298. As the scientists had learned, a gun-type weapon based on plutonium was impossible because that element had an unexpected property: spontaneous neutron emissions would cause the weapon to fizzle.[10] For both the gun-type and the implosion weapons, a production schedule had been established and both would be available during 1945. Some of the highlighted parts even emphasize signs of life (contrary to all the evidence, we saw how in various places the grass was beginning to turn green and even on some scorched trees new leaves were appearing.). Later that year, the Uranium Committee completed its report and OSRD Chairman Vannevar Bush reported the findings to President Roosevelt: As Bush emphasized, the U.S. findings were more conservative than those in the British MAUD report: the bomb would be somewhat less effective, would take longer to produce, and at a higher cost. [58]. Thousands more would die of radiation exposure. The killing of workers in the urban-industrial sector was one of the explicit goals of the air campaign against Japanese cities. The possibility of modifying the concept of unconditional surrender so that it guaranteed the continuation of the emperor remained hotly contested within the U.S. government. The embassy teams included GRU members Mikhail Ivanov and German Sergeev in August, and TASS correspondent Anatoliy Varshavskiy, former acting military attach Mikhail Romanov, and Naval apparatus employee Sergey Kikenin in September. Moreover, ethical questions have shrouded the bombings which caused terrible human losses and in succeeding decades fed a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union and now Russia and others. [69]. When the atomic bomb was dropped over Hiroshima and then Nagasaki, Americans felt both deep satisfaction and deep anxiety, and these responses have coexisted ever since. Barton J. Bernsteins 1987 article, Ike and Hiroshima: Did He Oppose It?The Journal of Strategic Studies10 (1987): 377-389, makes a case against relying on Eisenhowers memoirs and points to relevant circumstantial evidence. For detailed background on the Army Air Forces incendiary bombing planning, see Schaffer (1985) 107-127. With more information on the Alamogordo test available, Groves provided Marshall with detail on the destructive power of atomic weapons. See Janet Farrell Brodie, Radiation Secrecy and Censorship after Hiroshima and Nagasaki,The Journal of Social History48 (2015): 842-864. [22]. The nuclear age had truly begun with the first military use of atomic weapons. Washington, D.C., 20037, Phone: 202/994-7000 This set of documents concerns the work of the Uranium Committee of the National Academy of Sciences, an exploratory project that was the lead-up to the actual production effort undertaken by the Manhattan Project. See also Malloy (2008), at 116-117, including the argument that 1) Stimson was deceiving himself by accepting the notion that a vital war plant surrounded by workers houses was a legitimate military target, and 2) that Groves was misleading Stimson by withholding the Target Committees conclusions that the target would be a city center. On August 6th, 1945 at 8:15 A.M. the U.S. dropped an atomic bomb over the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Riabevs notes, it is possible that Berias copy of this letter ended up in Stalins papers. Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard joined those scientists who sought to avoid military use of the bomb; he proposed a preliminary warning so that the United States would retain its position as a great humanitarian nation. Alperovitz cites evidence that Bard discussed his proposal with Truman who told him that he had already thoroughly examined the problem of advanced warning. On August 10, one day after the bombing of Nagasaki, the . The notion that the atomic bombs caused . The numbered items are military and industrial installations with the percentages of total destruction. [11], Documents 6A-D: President Truman Learns the Secret, G 77, Commanding Generals file no. [15]. How is the current debate about immigration in the United States rooted in our nations past? Moreover, the atrocities of the bombs were not made graphically public to the Japanese people until August 6, 1952, when Asahi Graphpublished the issue titled Genbaku higai no shokkai (the first publication of the damages of the atomic bomb). [30]. [38], Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, Magic Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18. [59]. The atomic bomb changed STALIN'S attitude. Bush-Conant papers, S-1 Historical File, Reports to and Conferences with the President (1942-1944), National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter RG 77), Manhattan Engineering District (MED), Minutes of the Military Policy Meeting (5 May 1943), Correspondence (Top Secret) of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946, microfilm publication M1109 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1980), Roll 3, Target 6, Folder 23, Military Policy Committee, Minutes of Meetings, Before the Manhattan Project had produced any weapons, senior U.S. government officials had Japanese targets in mind. [37], RG 165, Army Operations OPD Executive File #17, Item 13 (copy courtesy of J. Samuel Walker), The day after the Togo message was reported, Army intelligence chief Weckerling proposed several possible explanations of the Japanese diplomatic initiative. Would the Soviet declaration of war have been enough to compel Tokyo to admit defeat? (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-AEC), The polar cap of the "Fat Man" weapon being sprayed with plastic spray paint in front of Assembly Building Number 2. Reasons Why the U.S. Whether or not the atomic bombs should have been dropped is a topic that is still debated. Moreover, to shed light on the considerations that induced Japans surrender, this briefing book includes new translations of Japanese primary sources on crucial events, including accounts of the conferences on August 9 and 14, where Emperor Hirohito made decisions to accept Allied terms of surrender. Moscows opening to Japan in 2015 then engendered a shift in Japan-Russia relations, as confirmed by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrovs visit to Tokyo in April, Prime Minister Shinzo Abes bold visit to Moscow in May and Naryshkins visit to Tokyo in June 2016, right after President Obamas historical visit to Hiroshima at the end of May. The record of this meeting has figured in the complex debate over the estimates of casualties stemming from a possible invasion of Japan. President Truman, who ordered the bomb, defended it as a way to bring about surrender and save U.S. military lives that would have been lost in a ground invasion of Japan. Initialed by President Roosevelt (VB OK FDR), this may have been the closest that he came to a formal approval of the Manhattan Project. As Alperovitz notes, the Davies papers include variant diary entries and it is difficult to know which are the most accurate. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-BT), A photo prepared by U.S. Air Intelligence for analytical work on the destructiveness of atomic weapons. The explosion over Hiroshima wiped out 95 percent of the city and killed 80,000 people. Yet, according to Forrest Pogues account, when Truman asked McCloy if he had any comments, the latter opened up a discussion of nuclear weapons use by asking Why not use the bomb?[30]. According to Robert S. Norris, this was the fateful decision to turn over the atomic project to military control.[8]. At the time of the first report, various methods for producing a chain reaction were envisioned and money was being budgeted to try them out. At the end, Stimson shared his doubts about targeting cities and killing civilians through area bombing because of its impact on the U.S.s reputation as well as on the problem of finding targets for the atomic bomb. Three-quarters of a century on, Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain emblematic of the dangers and human costs of warfare, specifically the use of nuclear weapons. 5, 27-35 [Translated by Toshihiro Higuchi], The Byrnes Note did not break the stalemate at the cabinet level. The timing of the trip to Hiroshima and Nagasaki within 40 days of the bombings illustrates the Soviet race to obtain its own atomic bomb, but the timing of the 2015 re-release of these documents is also significant: it came at a time when US-Russia relations were suffering a major deterioration. Record Group 457, Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, Magic Diplomatic Summaries 1942-1945, box 18. The atomic bomb is the subject of much controversy. After a White House meeting on 14 August, British Minister John Balfour reported that Truman had remarked sadly that he now had no alternative but to order an atomic bomb to be dropped on Tokyo. This was likely emotional thinking spurred by anxiety and uncertainty. This photo was taken from the Red Cross Hospital Building about one mile from the bomb burst. With the goal of having enough fissile material by the first half of 1945 to produce the bombs, Bush was worried that the Germans might get there first. Women and children had been taught how to kill with basic weapons. By Marc Gallicchio. [60], W.A. That there may be a difference between the two sources becomes evident from some of the entries; for example, in the entry for July 18, 1945 Brown wrote: "Although I knew about the atomic bomb when I wrote these notes, I dared not place it in writing in my book., The degree to which the typed-up version reflects the original is worth investigating. See Bernstein (1995), 142. A. Zolotarev, ed., Sovetsko-Iaponskaia Voina 1945 Goda: Istoriia Voenno-Politicheskogo Protivoborstva Dvukh Derzhav v 3040e Gody (Moscow: Terra, 1997 and 2000), Vol. [29], According to accounts based on post-war recollections and interviews, during the meeting McCloy raised the possibility of winding up the war by guaranteeing the preservation of the emperor albeit as a constitutional monarch. The documents introduced here were published in Russian for the first time in 1990, and the English version was included in an issue of the Soviet journal International Affairs (1990, no. Over 200,000 people were killed. Truman Plays Part of Himself in Skit at Gridiron Dinner, and List of Members and Guests at the Gridiron Show,The Washington Post, 16 December 1945. . In late February 1945, months before atomic bombs were ready for use, the high command selected Tinian, an island in the Northern Marianas Islands, for that base. As for target cities, the committee agreed that the following should be exempt from Army Air Force bombing so they would be available for nuclear targeting: Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama, and Kokura Arsenal. As Hull explained, should we not concentrate on targets that will be of greatest assistance to an invasion rather than industry, morale, psychology, etc. Nearer the tactical use, Seaman agreed and they discussed the tactics that could be used for beach landings. How did the U.S. government plan to use the bombs? [46]. Rather, they are mostly about damage to inanimate objects. Historians have suggested a number of ways in which the atomic bomb might have alienated Stalin- 1. Probably the work of General George A. Lincoln at Army Operations, this document was prepared a few weeks before the Potsdam conference when senior officials were starting to finalize the text of the declaration that Truman, Churchill, and Chiang would issue there. In 1934, Japan ended its cooperation with other major powers in the Pacific by withdrawing from the Five Power Treaty. Some of the key elements of Stimsons argument were his assumption that Japan is susceptible to reason and that Japanese might be even more inclined to surrender if we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty. The possibility of a Soviet attack would be part of the threat. As part of the threat message, Stimson alluded to the inevitability and completeness of the destruction which Japan could suffer, but he did not make it clear whether unconditional surrender terms should be clarified before using the atomic bomb. Riabev, ed., Atomnyi Proekt SSSR (Moscow: izd MFTI, 2002), Volume 1, Part 2, 335-336. This issue of the diplomatic summary also includes Togos account of his notification of the Soviet declaration of war, reports of Soviet military operations in the Far East, and intercepts of French diplomatic traffic. Concerned with the long-run implications of the bomb, Franck chaired a committee, in which Szilard and Eugene Rabinowitch were major contributors, that produced a report rejecting a surprise attack on Japan and recommended instead a demonstration of the bomb on the desert or a barren island. Arguing that a nuclear arms race will be on in earnest not later than the morning after our first demonstration of the existence of nuclear weapons, the committee saw international control as the alternative. Stimsons diary mentions meetings with Eisenhower twice in the weeks before Hiroshima, but without any mention of a dissenting Eisenhower statement (and Stimsons diaries are quite detailed on atomic matters). These cables are the earliest reports of the mission; the bombing of Nagasaki killed immediately at least 39,000 people, with more dying later. Plainly Davies thought otherwise. [38]. Open Document. However, the Department of the Interior opposed the disclosure of the nature of the weapon. Marshall noted the opprobrium which might follow from an ill considered employment of such force. This document has played a role in arguments developed by Barton J. Bernstein that figures such as Marshall and Stimson were caught between an older morality that opposed the intentional killing of non-combatants and a newer one that stressed virtually total war.[22], RG 77, MED Records, H-B files, folder no. As indicated by the L.D. Three days later another atomic device was exploded over Nagasaki. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-BT), The mushroom cloud billowing up 20,000 feet over Hiroshima on the morning of August 6, 1945 (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-AEC), The Enola Gay returns to Tinian Island after the strike on Hiroshima. A few weeks later, on September 2, 1945 Japanese representatives signed surrender documents on the USS Missouri, in Tokyo harbor.[71]. [43]. The last remark aggravated Navy Minister Yonai who saw it as irresponsible. Sato cabled Togo earlier that he saw no point in approaching the Soviets on ending the war until Tokyo had concrete proposals. Any aid from the Soviets has now become extremely doubtful.. [80], Despite Trumans claim that he made the most terrible decision at Potsdam, he assigned himself more responsibility than the historical record supports. Due to the relations of Russia . The U.S. reply, drafted during the course of the day, did not explicitly reject the note but suggested that any notion about the prerogatives of the Emperor would be superceded by the concept that all Japanese would be Subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. The language was ambiguous enough to enable Japanese readers, upon Hirohitos urging, to believe that they could decide for themselves the Emperors future role. Harriman opined that surrender is in the bag because of the Potsdam Declarations provision that the Japanese could choose their own form of government, which would probably include the Emperor. Further, the only alternative to the Emperor is Communism, implying that an official role for the Emperor was necessary to preserve social stability and prevent social revolution. See also Malloy, A Very Pleasant Way to Die, 539-540. To suggest alternatives, they drafted this memorandum about the importance of the international exchange of information and international inspection to stem dangerous nuclear competition. According to Herbert Bix, for months Hirohito had believed that the outlook for a negotiated peace could be improved if Japan fought and won one last decisive battle, thus, he delayed surrender, continuing to procrastinate until the bomb was dropped and the Soviets attacked.[52]. In the surprise attack, Japan sunk several ships, destroyed hundreds of planes and ended thousands of lives. [16], RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File no. The dropping of two atomic bombs, the tremendous destruction caused by U.S. bombing, and the Soviet declaration of war notwithstanding, important elements of the Japanese Army were unwilling to yield, as was evident from intercepted messages dated 12 and 13 August. As the Russian invasion of Ukraine shows, nuclear threats are real, present, and dangerous. As to how the war with Japan would end, he saw it as unpredictable, but speculated that it will take Russian entry into the war, combined with a landing, or imminent threat of a landing, on Japan proper by us, to convince them of the hopelessness of their situation. Lincoln derided Hoovers casualty estimate of 500,000. The last major battle, the fight for Okinawa, lasted almost three months and took more than 100,000 Japanese and American lives. [79]. If there was a misfire the weapon would be difficult for the Japanese to recover, which would not be the case if Tokyo was targeted. Meiklejohn recounted Harrimans visit in early October 1945 to the Frankfurt-area residence of General Dwight Eisenhower, who was finishing up his service as Commanding General, U.S. Army, European Theater. The bomb was dropped to impress the Soviets, and persuade them to relax their grip on eastern Europe. Atomic Bomb Dbq; Atomic Bomb Dbq. Thankfully, nuclear weapons have not been exploded in war since 1945, perhaps owing to the taboo against their use shaped by the dropping of the bombs on Japan. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-MDH), Hiroshima, after the first atomic bomb explosion. Alperovitz, Bernstein, and Sherwin made new contributions as did other historians, social scientists, and journalists including Richard B. Frank, Herbert Bix, Sadao Asada, Kai Bird, Robert James Maddox, Sean Malloy, Robert P. Newman, Robert S. Norris, Tsuyoshi Hagesawa, and J. Samuel Walker.[4]. As Russia wages war in Ukraine, experts have described what would happen in a nuclear strike, which is unlikely. Barton J. Bernstein and Martin Sherwin have argued that if top Washington policymakers had kept tight control of the delivery of the bomb instead of delegating it to Groves the attack on Nagasaki could have been avoided. The 12 July 1945 Magic summary includes a report on a cable from Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to Ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow concerning the Emperors decision to seek Soviet help in ending the war. However, as soon as the Allied occupation of Japan came into force on September 19, the strict press code imposed by the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, as well as the above-mentioned self-censorship imposed by the Japanese press, caused a delay in the way the atomic bombings were reported upon in Japan. However, it is striking that none of the people sent to ground zero in the immediate aftermath of the bombings were scientists or technicians. Bix appears to have moved toward a position close to Hasegawas; see Bix, Japan's Surrender Decision and the Monarchy: Staying the Course in an Unwinnable War,Japan Focus. For varied casualty figures cited by Truman and others after the war, see Walker,Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan, 101-102. The total destruction of that city, and the instant incineration of 40,000 mostly civilian people, occurred just three days after the destruction of Hiroshima by a 15-kiloton uranium bomb, which instantly killed 70,000. On October 30, 1961, the Soviet Union tested the largest nuclear device ever created. The diary entries cover July 16, 17, 18, 20, 25, 26, and 30 and include Trumans thinking about a number of issues and developments, including his reactions to Churchill and Stalin, the atomic bomb and how it should be targeted, the possible impact of the bomb and a Soviet declaration of war on Japan, and his decision to tell Stalin about the bomb.